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TOWARDS JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY -
ARE THE EXCUSES GETTING LAMER?
Allan C. Hutchinson*
Chief Justice Lamer leaves no doubt about his intentions. The title gives it all
away - "The Rule of Law and Judicial Independence: Protecting Core Values in
Times of Change". His paper is an encomium for conservative values. If there
were any lingering doubts, the fact that the only legal theorist that he calls in aid
of his thesis is A.V. Dicey clinches it: whatever his historical reputation, Dicey's
contemporary standing is as a quaint apologist for an undemocratic and elitist
form of politics. In his defence of the Rule of Law and judicial independence, the
Chief Justice wants to ensure that recent changes in the constitutional and political
landscape "do not place the critically important constitutional value of judicial
independence at risk."' For him, the Rule of Law and judicial independence are
the glue that holds together the fragile democratic compact between citizens and
the state. Because "the primary obligation of the judiciary is not to the majority
of the electors but to the law", the need for judicial independence is paramount
and "the notion of accountability is fundamentally inconsistent with [its]
maintenance".2 All in all, it is a rousing affirmation of traditional values in the
name of constitutional necessity - judges are most independent when they are
least accountable.
I maintain that this thesis is not only wrong, but dangerous. In this short
comment, I intend to challenge the Chief Justice's defence of judicial
independence or, at least, a his particular version of it. I will do this by looking
at his discussion of judicial education and judicial discipline. However, let me be
clear from the beginning - I am not against judicial independence, far from it. My
contention is that there is a need for a robust practice of judicial independence,
but that Lamer's account misses the mark by a long shot. Indeed, his insistence
that judicial independence is antithetical to increased judicial accountability is
wrong-headed; it smacks of special pleading by judges for judges. On the contrary,
I maintain that, once there is a richer and more informed understanding of what
judicial independence demands, the best way to achieve it is through a vigorous
increase in the types of various procedures - compulsory education and lay
participation in judicial discipline, for example - available to effect judicial
accountability. If there is to be a serious respect for and public confidence in
judicial independence, it will be with more and not less judicial accountability.
Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
'A- Lamer, "The Rule of Law and Judicial Independence: Protecting Core Values in Times of
Change" (1996) 45 U.N.B.L.J. 3 at 12.
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The development of judicial training and continuing education programmes - what
the Chief Justice calls "social context education"3 - is of recent vintage. The
hope of many of its proponents is not to indoctrinate the judiciary with a set of
politically correct values. At their best, such programmes will open judicial minds,
not close them; the aim is to encourage critical thinking rather than to peddle
official orthodoxy. Indeed, Lamer himself notes that judicial education "is
designed to make judges both more aware of and better able to respond to the
many social, cultural, economic and other differences that exist in the highly
pluralistic society in which we perform our important duties."4  However, he
argues that, if such initiatives are to be mandatory for all judges and to be
designed by non-judges, they "must be vigorously resisted" because they would be
"counterproductive" and "would threaten judicial independence in a fundamental
way."'5 Apart from the difficulties of enforcing mandatory attendance by judges,
the Chief Justice maintains that any dependence on outside bodies will impair the
judiciary's independence and, "more importantly, this lack of independence will
almost certainly have an adverse effect on the perception, if not the reality, of the
judiciary's impartiality."6
My contention is that, far from impairing the perception and/or reality of
judicial impartiality, such mandatory and external programmes will actually
enhance it. The Chief Justice has the argument completely the wrong way round.
Without a vigorous, compulsory and continuing series of educational initiatives, the
judiciary is in grave danger not only of losing touch with a changing political and
social reality, but also of fuelling the perception and the reality that judges are not
to be entrusted with the great powers (and responsibilities) that they presently
possess. Lamer's implicit invocation of a besieged and mismaligned judiciary that
struggles to mete out justice in an impartial and non-partisan way is distorted.
While judicial indiscretions are not so few and so trivial as Lamer urges nor are
the workings of the Judicial Council as efficient, it is the deeper and less obvious
ideological orientation of the judges that is the cause for critical concern and the
object of civic improvement. Contrary to Lamer's views, the problem is not that
the presently independent judge will fall captive to the agenda of certain pressure
groups. They already and always have done. Rather, it is the rarely acknowledged
and often unappreciated fact that the judiciary shares a social outlook and political
affinity with the established interests of the status quo. This general orientation







obvious. It is the taken-for-granted partial ground on which they take their
impartial stands.
While the vast majority of judges perform a difficult task with integrity and in
good faith, they fail to accept that their independence is only one kind of
dependence on a necessarily political (but not politically necessary) set of values
and assumptions. Sharing a similar frame of reference, judges are not obliged to
confront or question it in their working environment. Unfortunately, lawyers tend
to pander to judges, not upbraid them for their failings. Also, unfortunately, so
do many academics. In any other context, law professors would not accept such
weak or self-serving arguments. Put at its crudest, the largely male, white,
Christian, middle-aged and propertied judiciary tend to resist or reject any
progressive view that challenges too squarely the shibboleths of a moderate
conservatism. They are long on lip-service to the formal virtues of equality, but
short on commitment to their substantive application. This is understandable, yet
not justifiable as a non-political posture. It is to the Chief Justice's credit that he
makes that conservative commitment clear and open.
In Lamer's lament, there is a discernible nostalgia for an older and better
practice of republican politics in which lawyers played a less controversial and
more professional part. Sad to report, it is not only too late, but it has never been
possible for judges to fulfil their responsibilities in a neutral or non-political way:
law is simply politics in more sophisticated garb. More than that, neutrality is not
even a desirable or healthy ideal in a society which aspires to be truly democratic.
Black-robed pro-consuls have no place in modern polities. Of course, the
democratic status of judges has always been suspect. The fragility of their
legitimacy arises not so much from their exercise of power, but more from the
nagging doubts about the warrant under which they wield it. Lawyers must claim
to speak and act in a voice other than their own; they must justify themselves by
reference to an authority beyond themselves - the law. As the Chief Justice puts
it, "[t]he primary obligation of the judiciary is not to the majority of the electors
but to the law".7 Yet, the fact is that we can never simply 'apply the law' because
the question of the relevant and precise law and what applying it entails remains
irresolvably contestable. Once it is conceded - as it must be - that law does not
lend itself to formulaic application or robotic predictability, the matter of judgment
and values rears its inconvenient head. Law does not speak for itself, it has to be
spoken for by judges.
If independence or neutrality is to mean anything, it must mean a recognition
of one's own predispositions and a constant willingness to re-interrogate them.
The only difference between judges with politics and those without is that the
former know what their politics are. The Chief Justice's refusal to even
7/bid. at 13.
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acknowledge that 'applying the law' is a contested and fraught practice is
disappointing. Of course, judges must be above the day-to-day shenanigans of
partisan politics, but it is mistaken to insist that they must be or even can be
completely free of ideological predispositions and political values. It is more
intellectually honest and more politically astute to accept that judges make their
decisions because of, and not in spite of, their values and perspectives. Legal rules
and principles are not unimportant nor are they irrelevant to any decision made,
but they are never determinative in their own right and are never outside the play
of political power. Accordingly, the identity and social vision of the judge is
crucial. Insofar as we continue to turn to courts on issues of social justice, it is
vital that more attention be paid to the ideological make-up of judges and that the
myths of judicial objectivity and neutrality be exploded. There is no place to which
judges may escape to make impersonal and strongly detached judgments -
especially not the illusory ground of Law itself.
Continuing education and public criticism are the lifeblood of a healthy
democratic society. Without such spurs, the polity's servants begin to think and
act as though they are its masters. Like Lamer, they become tempted to portray
themselves and their judicial colleagues as the misunderstood defenders of the
constitutional faith and the reluctant saviours of an ungrateful public. The Chief
Justice misses the whole point of the drive to make the judicial crystal palace more
transparent to public scrutiny and more accountable to popular expectations. To
resist comment and education in the name of judicial independence and wisdom
is a very dubious ploy. Far from making the case against judicial education,
Lamer's speech is the best evidence of the pressing need for continuing legal
education. It is essential that judges be obliged to undergo further and continuing
education. In an important sense, they have already been brain-washed by their
formal legal training and their informal education of a life in the law. The best
that occasional seminars can hope to do is to counter-act the worst excesses of
that enduring process.
Requiring public officials to attend seminars on violence against women or
racism cannot be construed, as many judges seem to do, as a campaign of political
correctness. At their best, criticism and education can combine to prod a reluctant
judiciary to bring out for scrutiny their basic operating assumptions and to evaluate
them in light of the demands of a society that professes to be democratic and
egalitarian in its practices and aspirations. With the privilege of power comes the
duty of responsibility. When judges refuse to participate in such programs, it is
time to re-consider their appropriateness to remain in office - a closed mind is
next to a bigoted one. When such illiberal attitudes are championed by the Chief
Justice of Canada, it is an occasion for profound regret, especially when it is done




In his defence of judicial independence, the other matter on which the Chief
Justice concentrates is lay participation in the disciplinary process for judicial
misconduct. After sketching the present process in which complaints against
judges are heard and resolved almost entirely by other judges, he is at pains to
emphasize the seriousness of such inquiries and how important it is to deal with
complaints in a public and effective manner. Nevertheless, the Chief Justice draws
the line at lay participation in such proceedings. He finds "unpersuasive" the
argument that the inclusion of laypersons "will improve the quality of the decisions
made" by enhancing the "visibility" of the process and "thereby increas[ing] public
confidence that the complaints are being dealt with properly."' For him, the
present openness of hearings, the opportunity for public comment and the
possibility of legislative action are more than adequate to meet the demands for
judicial accountability. Indeed, he goes so far as to claim that "lay participation
in the process would be little more than window-dressing."
At the heart of his defence of the status quo and his rejection of lay
participation is, of course, an assertion that such reforms would imperil judicial
independence. Arguing that the inclusion of laypersons and other related matters
"would be unsound as a matter of constitutional principle", the Chief Justice
contends that it will also "run the risk of inhibiting at least some judges from
making the unpopular rulings that all of us are required to make from time to
time [and] place at risk the sense of independence of mind that is critically
important to a judiciary in a society based on the rule of law."'" This defence
bears all the hallmarks of the same misplaced optimism and unconvincing
arguments that the Chief Justice used to resist the extension of judicial education.
In particular, he elides entirely the controversial issue of whether so-called
constitutional principle is ascertainable apart from its judicial elaboration: he
assumes the very matter that his arguments are intended to demonstrate.
However, his resort to judicial independence to stem further judicial accountability
in the form of lay participation illuminates further the constrained and partial
notion of 'judicial independence' on which Lamer relies.
There are at least two problems with this stance - one formal and the other
substantive. The more formal objection is that, even if the Chief Justice was right
(and I do not think that he is) in his assessment that lay participation "will [not]
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such involvement as a matter of "public confidence".' 2  While it is true that
various methods already exist - public hearings, written reasons, etc. - to ensure
that judicial discipline is not meted out behind closed doors and without
explanation, these innovations are not beyond improvement or increase.
Moreover, the introduction of lay participation will only improve the extent to
which the disciplinary process is seen to be open and will enhance "public
confidence that the complaints are being dealt with properly."13  If Lamer is
genuinely concerned with the legitimacy, felt and real, of the judicial discipline
process, he need not be worried that a requirement of lay participation will
jeopardize the process' perceived efficacy or acceptability. On the contrary, lay
participation can only help to make good on the democratic deficit that an
independent and unaccountable judiciary inevitably creates. Indeed, even if, as the
Chief Justice dismissively suggests, "lay participation in the process would be little
more than window-dressing", 4 it is no bad thing for that.
However, I do not believe that lay participation in disciplinary proceedings will
be mere "window-dressing" or that it "will [not] improve the quality of the
decisions made." The second and more substantive problem with Lamer's case
against lay participation is that it fails to appreciate the significant contribution
that public involvement can make. Insofar as such participation was reduced to
"little more than window-dressing," it would be attributable as much to the fault
of the cliquish habits of the judiciary as to any failing or inability on the part of lay
participants. Judges fail to realize that their view of the world is simply one
among many. With an almost aristocratic mien, many assume that no one else
could really understand the proper workings of the judicial world or mind. This,
of course, is nonsense. Indeed, it might well be that laypersons would actually
bring some genuine insight and new perspectives into the judicial and broader
legal communities. It would serve to break the circle of professional and insular
attitudes that encourages judges to hold on to the conceit that they not only know
what is best, but do so as a matter of natural and non-partial commonsense.
Again, such non-professional involvement is not a threat to judicial independence,
but an insurance against allegations that judicial independence is nothing more
than institutional protection for judges' dependent view of what amounts to
independence. As such, the objective of lay participation is not to undermine
judicial independence, but to allow judges to understand and gain a less parochial







As Lamer opines, "[j]udicial independence is not an end in itself."' 5 However,
one could be forgiven for thinking that the overall force of the Chief Justice's
lecture is to cultivate the contrary opinion that it was - that judicial independence
exists for the independent benefit of the judiciary. The Chief Justice leaves the
distinct and intended impression that the judges are and ought to remain the best
and only guarantors of their institutional independence. Like doctors, judges insist
that judges know best what is good for judges and, by implication, the polity at
large. For the Chief Justice, continuing education initiatives (or, at least, their
compulsory imposition) and lay participation are ephemeral fads that need to be
resisted in the name of eternal verities - "Core Values in Times of Change."
Indeed, Lamer chastises his critics by reminding them that "[wie would do well to
bear... in mind [that Canada has succeeded, where many countries have not, in
entrenching within its legal system both the rule of law and judicial independence]
when, because of changes within our own society, we see these [truly foundational]
values threatened... that we must all work hard to preserve intact.1 6
As I hope will be obvious, I believe that such efforts and energies are
misplaced. Far from being a worthy call to constitutional arms, the Chief Justice's
passionate plea is borne of complacency; some might even say hubris. Without an
appropriate and effective set of checks and balances, judicial independence can
easily come to resemble licence - self-serving arguments to justify the exercise of
enormous power without constraint or accountability. Judges would not
countenance or accept such weak arguments on behalf of independence and
against accountability from any other profession or group in society. We should
not so indulge judges, especially when it is claimed in the name of democracy or
"core values". If the Rule of Law is to mean anything in a truly democratic
society, it must be used as a principled objection to all efforts to accrue and
insulate official power from democratic scrutiny and legitimate control. It most
definitely ought not to be used to shield efforts by judges and lawyers to render
themselves beyond the reach of democratic appraisal and accountability.
Democracy is ill-served when the theory of the Rule of Law is converted into the
practice of the rule of lawyers.
The old saw of Lord Acton is made ever more pertinent by the Chief Justice's
plea for a less accountable judiciary - all power corrupts and absolute power
corrupts absolutely. Without some robust and realistic popular involvement in
judicial education and discipline, the suggestion might arise and receive credence
that the judiciary do have something to hide and that there is indeed something
' 5lbid. at 7.
' 6lid. at 18.
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rotten in the judicial state of Denmark. To respond to such suggestions with
righteous indignation, as some judges might be tempted to do, only serves to
underline the need for more and not less public participation in the organization
of the judicial process. As the Chief Justice is wont to remind Canadians, justice
should not only be done, but be seen to be done: this is surely one of the core
values of all "core values." Unfortunately, if the Chief Justice has his way, justice
would most certainly be less seen to be done and, even more troubling, it might
actually be less done.
